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股权结构对公司治理内部机制的影响

来源:http://www.jnsll.com 发布时间:2021-10-29 20:10:53 浏览次数:

1、股权结构和股东大会在控制权可竞争的股权结构模式中,剩余控制权和剩余索取权相互匹配,大股东就有动力去向经理层施加压力,促使其为实现公司价值最大化而努力;而在控制权不可竞争的股权结构模式中,剩余控制权和剩余索取权不相匹配,控制股东手中掌握的是廉价投票权,它既无压力也无动力去实施监控,而只会利用手中的权利去实现自己的私利。所以对一个股份制公司而言,不同的股权结构决定着股东是否能够积极主动地去实施其权利和承担其义务。
1. Ownership structure and general meeting of shareholders in the ownership structure mode in which the control right can compete, the residual control right and residual claim right match each other, and the major shareholders have the power to exert pressure on the managers and promote them to strive to maximize the value of the company; In the non competitive ownership structure mode of control, the residual control right does not match the residual claim right. The controlling shareholders hold the cheap voting right. It has neither pressure nor motivation to implement monitoring, but will only use the right in hand to realize their own private interests. Therefore, for a joint-stock company, different ownership structure determines whether shareholders can actively implement their rights and undertake their obligations.
2、股权结构与董事会和监事会股权结构在很大程度上决定了董事会的人选,在控制权可竞争的股权结构模式中,股东大会决定的董事会能够代表全体股东的利益;而在控制权不可竞争的股权结构模式中,由于占绝对控股地位的股东可以通过垄断董事会人选的决定权来获取对董事会的决定权。因而在此股权结构模式下,中小股东的利益将不能得到保障。股权结构对监事会影响也如此。
股权设计
2. The ownership structure and the ownership structure of the board of directors and the board of supervisors determine the candidates for the board of directors to a great extent. In the ownership structure mode in which the control right can compete, the board of directors decided by the general meeting of shareholders can represent the interests of all shareholders; In the non competitive ownership structure mode of control, the shareholders who occupy the absolute controlling position can obtain the decision-making power of the board of directors by monopolizing the decision-making power of the candidates of the board of directors. Therefore, under this ownership structure model, the interests of minority shareholders will not be guaranteed. The impact of ownership structure on the board of supervisors is the same.
3、股权结构与经理层股权股份结构对经理层的影响在于是否在经理层存在代理权的竞争。一般认为,股权结构过于分散易造成“内部人控制”,从而代理权竞争机制无法发挥监督作用;而在股权高度集中的情况下,经理层的任命被大股东所控制,从而也削弱了代理权的竞争性;相对而言,相对控股股东的存在比较有利于经理层在完全竞争的条件下进行更换。总之在控制权可竞争的股权结构下,股东、董事(或监事)和经理层能各司其职,各行其能,形成健康的制衡关系,使公司治理的内部监控机制发挥出来;而在控制权不可竞争的股权结构下,则相反。
3. The influence of ownership structure and managerial ownership share structure on the managerial level lies in whether there is agency competition at the managerial level. It is generally believed that too decentralized ownership structure is easy to cause "insider control", so that the agency competition mechanism can not play a supervisory role; In the case of highly concentrated equity, the appointment of managers is controlled by major shareholders, which also weakens the competitiveness of agency power; Relatively speaking, the existence of relative controlling shareholders is more conducive to the replacement of managers under the condition of complete competition. In short, under the ownership structure with competitive control, shareholders, directors (or supervisors) and managers can perform their respective duties and functions, form a healthy check and balance relationship, and give full play to the internal control mechanism of corporate governance; Under the ownership structure of non competitive control, the opposite is true.
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