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1. Ownership structure and general meeting of shareholders in the ownership structure mode in which the control right can compete, the residual control right and residual claim right match each other, and the major shareholders have the power to exert pressure on the managers and promote them to strive to maximize the value of the company; In the non competitive ownership structure mode of control, the residual control right does not match the residual claim right. The controlling shareholders hold the cheap voting right. It has neither pressure nor motivation to implement monitoring, but will only use the right in hand to realize their own private interests. Therefore, for a joint-stock company, different ownership structure determines whether shareholders can actively implement their rights and undertake their obligations.
2. The ownership structure and the ownership structure of the board of directors and the board of supervisors determine the candidates for the board of directors to a great extent. In the ownership structure mode in which the control right can compete, the board of directors decided by the general meeting of shareholders can represent the interests of all shareholders; In the non competitive ownership structure mode of control, the shareholders who occupy the absolute controlling position can obtain the decision-making power of the board of directors by monopolizing the decision-making power of the candidates of the board of directors. Therefore, under this ownership structure model, the interests of minority shareholders will not be guaranteed. The impact of ownership structure on the board of supervisors is the same.
3. The influence of ownership structure and managerial ownership share structure on the managerial level lies in whether there is agency competition at the managerial level. It is generally believed that too decentralized ownership structure is easy to cause "insider control", so that the agency competition mechanism can not play a supervisory role; In the case of highly concentrated equity, the appointment of managers is controlled by major shareholders, which also weakens the competitiveness of agency power; Relatively speaking, the existence of relative controlling shareholders is more conducive to the replacement of managers under the condition of complete competition. In short, under the ownership structure with competitive control, shareholders, directors (or supervisors) and managers can perform their respective duties and functions, form a healthy check and balance relationship, and give full play to the internal control mechanism of corporate governance; Under the ownership structure of non competitive control, the opposite is true.
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